U.S. TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATE INVESTMENT IN STRATEGIC SECTORS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY1 -INDUS TRIAL
Transnational corporate investment in South Africa mushroomed during the very years when independent governments took power and began to complete for investment, particularly in industry. The reasons for this relate to the specific, racist features of South Africa's political economy, and the interventionist role of the "k state, as well as the "bounded rationality" of corporate managements.
.Over the centuries following their first landing, white settlers employed military force and played one African group off against 2 ** Drawing on Cyert, March and Simon, Evans points out that corporate managers' decisions are rational "only within the cognitive boundaries created by the information available to the decision maker. What information is available depends on who makes the decision and where it is made." trouble whites or scare off foreign investors. Many of the uprooted African families had lived in the cities for generations; now they were forced into "homelands" they had never before seen. The regime tried to break down African unity by forcing them back into "tribal" groups, although a century of capitalist development had plunged Africans into the melting pot of proletarianization. New laws stripped Africans of the mockery of citizenship previously permitted; they now enjoyed "citizenship rights" only in the "independent"
Bantustans. If they could find a white employer, they might migrate to the prosperous "white" cities or estates. For those who remained behind -women, the unemployed, old men and childrenlife became a grinding round of poverty, hunger, and death: a slow, less visible form of violence, which has been compared to Hitler's genocide.
The Nationalist regime simultaneously introduced new measures to encourage investment in manufacturing. It used typical statecapitalist procedures to cajole and pressure transnational corporations to extend their investments from last-stage assembly and processing plants to vertically integrated industries providing a wide range of basic industrial products. The regime broadened its own 3tate corporate structure'-through an Industrial Corporation of South Africa. Each leading parastatal group* had its own complex of affiliates and subsidiaries, many of them part-owned by domestic and foreign private firms. Among the largest parastatals, -Iscor, the iron-and-steel corporation, produced almost three fourths of the steel consumed in South Africa in the 1970s.
Transnationals and mining finance houses invested heavily in its largest subsidiaries, and transnationals provided it *A parastatal is an autonomous corporation in which the state holds shares.
with the advanced technologies needed to compete internationally, --Escom, the electricity utility, undertook, with transnational corporate assistance, to construct a southern african grid of thermal, hydroelectric and nuclear power plants,
-Sasol produced oil and petrochemical by-products from coal, * using sophisticated technology supplied by U.S, and FRG transnationals ( a project of particular importance as the regime faced an oil boycott and had no known natural oil ~ n reserves). owned the most extensive rail network in Africa, and operated and modernized South Africa's port facilities.
-Sentrachem collaborated with transnational chemicals corporations to establish a domestic chemicals industry.
In 1964, the government established a wholly-owned parastat&l, Armscor, which contracted with hundreds of private and parastatal firms to produce parts and equipment for its growing military machine. It drew on the expanding national industrial base to achieve an increasingly self-reliant,dapital-intensive capacity for 4 production of military hardware.
The African majority never submitted docilely to the intensified onslaught on their rights. The African National Congress (ANC), a broad united-fropt group established in 1912, united wider and wider segments the population -not only Africans, but also ColoredS' , Asians and seme whites -to struggle against apartheid.
Mass demonstrations and strikes spread across the country. In 1961, Africans protesting the pass system were gunned down at the Sharpeville and Langa townships. Over 100 people were killed.
The regime outlawed both the ANC and a group that had split from it, the Pan-Africanist Congress. Organizers were detained, tortured, sentenced under laws that made simply speaking out for change illegal; strikers were deported to the Bantustans or jailed; peace ful demonstrations were fired on. The liberation movement turned to armed struggle.
In this context, transnational corporations vied to expand their investments, especially in the country's strategic manufacturing industries. The corporations' bottom line was profit; and, until the mid-1970s, profits in South African ranked among the highest in the world. U.S. manufacturing corporations with investments 5 in South Africa reported that they remitted home a share of profits equal to 16-18 per cent of their invested capital annually from 1970 to 1974. They reinvested an additional share, ranging from 6 to 12 per cent of their invested capital, to expand output in South Africa. Thus they enjoyed at least a 25 per cent rate of profit -far higher than their returns at home* U.S..firms in South African mining and smelting and oil refining in some years reported profits of over 40 per cent. When the economic crisis engulfed the Sox ..h African economy in the mid-'70s, manufacturing profit declined, and so did the rate of remittance to the United States. Nonetheless, some manufacturing tra.nsnationals in strategic % industries still reported high returns and continued to augment their investments.
High transnational corporate profits in South Africa resulted primarily from low costs. Black workers' wages were exceptionally low compared to those the transnationals paid at home. The wages 'of manufacturing workers in South Africa rose in response to infla tion and the strike wave of the early-'70s. Yet they remained not only well below those in the developed capitalist countries, but also, for the vast majority of black workers, below the bare minimum needed to support themselves and their families. Stepped-up military production had played a critical role, rtr *The South African regime grossly-underrepresented black unemployment. It altogether ignored black women unemployed.26
strengthening the regime's ability to maintain apartheid while expanding the domestic market. But it also increased state expenditures.
To avoid discouraging, continued investment, the regime raised taxes on lower-and middle-income groups, further limiting the 27 domestic market for consumer goods.
Meanwhile 
22.
Another GE affiliate, one of the largest Japanese electrical companies, Tokyo Shibaura Electric, supplied the South African Only the U.S. ana Britain spent a higher share of their GNP on computers than South Africa. Despite the mid-r70s recession, computers continued to "sell like hotcakes," reaching 1500, valued 23.
' at over $500 million, in 1976. South Africa imported all its computers, * as it had no domestic computer industry. As long as any computer services were sold to any firm in South Africa, it was difficult for the U.S. government to prevent them from being used for military purposes.
Nuclear technology: In 1977, satellite reconnaissance discovered an installation in the Kalahari Desert which resembled a testing facility for nuclear explosives. The South African regime claimed it had no plans to produce atomic weapons. But it later denied it had pledged v the U.S. government it would never do so, and refused to sign the 56 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Analysts, emphasizing that there
57
is no such thing as a soley 'peaceful' nuclear technology concluded the minority regime probably had the capacity to produce nuclear bombs.
In 1979, U.S. satellites detected a nuclear explosion in the ocean off the South African coast, which later reports exposed as the result in South and southern Africa, the more they would have a built-in interest in continuing to supply oil imports. To compensate, for its own lack of oil reserves, the South African government, with transnational corporate help, reduced its dependence on oil by intensive development of other energy resources, including hydroelectric and 6s nuclear power.to less than a fourth of its total energy needs.
But its demand for that irreducible minimum remained.
In the 1960s, to guard against the danger of an oil embargo, the South African government introduced measures to build up oil stock-*It is interesting to contrast this to the Brazilian case where Petrobas, with i4*s own oil wells, developed its own refining and distributing capacity, creating "a crisis for the multinationals...."D^ piles. 66 Third, South Africa's balance of payments, adversely affected in the ♦Footnote: The Bank of America, which admitted outstanding credit to South Africa worth $188 million, in 1977, explained that over half represented short-term loans to commercial banks, while over a quarter of the rest constituted loans to private and public corporations for "trade-related purposes or financing of industrial development projects." The largest recipient of the remainder was the South African government, which borrowed short-term funds to ease pressure on the balance of payments.
If this breakdown was' typical for all lenders, the total of loans reported for the private sector by the South African Reserve Bank -which did not include loans made to commercial bankswas significantly'understated.
• ~ • * -. . . : They willingly created a conduit for expanding the overseas sales of South Africa's gold, helping it to sustain the world price until, at the end of the decade, the international monetary crisis boosted it to incredible heights.
Without this multi-faceted contribution of U.S. transnational corporations and banks, it seems unlikely that South Africa's minority could continue to ignore the growing internal and external demands for an end to its dictatorial rule
